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"The fundamental argument for flexible exchange rates
is thatthey would allow countries autonomy with respect
to theirmonetary, fiscal and other policy instruments.
The argument for flexible rates can be put more strongly
still: flexible exchange rates are essential to the
preservation of national autonomy and independence consis-
tent with efficient organization and development of the
world economy."
Harry G. Johnson, 1969.
In movingfrom exchangecontrol and trade discrimination of the 1950s to
the open economic systemof the 1960s, the world economy had a brief re;urn
totheliberal order, credited with economic progress of the40years period
priorto World War I. There can be little doubt that the 1960s were the best
ten years span the world economy has experienced in this century. But the
very source of the success——an actively managed macroeconomy where the
monetary and fiscal six was directed to achieve satisfactory, sustoined
growth——also brought the disintegration. Inflation preferences were
*pinancial support was provided by agrant from the National Science
Foundation. I wishto acknowledge helpful comments from Franco Modigliani
andJohnWilliamson and research assistance from Alberto Giovaninni and Larry
Schembri.2
irreconcilablebetween the US and Europe and productivity growth
differentials were too large to accommodate a world economy on fixed exchange
rates.
Harry Johnson's perceptive assessment quoted above, as seen from the
perspective of the late 1960s, was shared widely. Flexible exchange rates
were then seen as an essential further step toward a liberal world system,
allowing countries to have the advantages of free markets in goods and assets
and yet enjoy domestic macroeconomic independence. Now, after ten years of
experience with flexible exchange rates there is much less confidence that
flexible rates and domestic policy autonomy are reconcilable. Quite on the
contrary, exercise of policy autonomy becomes near impossible because many
countries are too small and open to accept the exchange rate variations
induced by policy. Alternatively, in the case of large countries, the
effects of policy are exported abroad and come to interfere with foreign
internal stability. What is left of flexible exchange rates is an ability to
isolate a country from the world inflation trend, but riot from the effects of
policies that initiate a change in trend, nor from any other disturbances.
The traditional argument against flexible exchange rates, coming from
the experience of the interwar period, is that flexible rates are unstable,
move about erratically, and often aggravate the macroeconomic stability
problem. The experience of the last ten year would certainly lead an
observer to endorse that view. Anytime there is monetary and fiscal
dislocation in a major country, as has certainly been the case in the U.S.,
flexible rates perform poorly because they lead to excessive real exchange
rate changes and to the export of inflation or deflation abroad. Flexible
rates leave us with as much interdependence, or even more, as does a fixed3
rate regime. This paper reviews the channels of interdependence and asks in
what directions we should look for a system that maintains anopen world
economy but more effectively comes to terms with the priority of national
policy autonomy that is accepted as a fact.
There are broadly three avenues: we can make exchange rates more fixed,
we can make them less flexible, or we can take the route suggested by
Nodigliani and Tobin in limiting the incentives for shortrun capital mobility
permanently or on an ad hoc basis. It seems certain that free market
economics bar consideration of a capital account tax as embodying a wicked
infringement on individual freedom. It is also likely that US macroeconomic
policies, and policies abroad, remain unpredictable and uncoordinated to an
extent that precludes establishment of an exchange rate band or even fixed
rates. What is left then is the spirit of Versailles; that there may be
circumstances where it is not impossible that there might be intervention
which could turn out not to be small. In the meantime, in a more
constructive direction, there is a strong case for a different domestic
policy mix to go with flexible rates.
1. The Channels of Interdependence
In this part we sketch a model of interdependence on the aggregate
demand and supply side. The purpose of the model is to draw attention to
distinctchannelsand to identifythe pnraraeter.thatare of relevance in
assessingthe importance of these sources of interdependence.We first
considera standard macroeconomic model, focussing on prices, aggregate
demand, perfect asset substitutability and rational expectations. Extensions
follow in subsequent sections.4
ExchangeRates, Employment and Wages1
To study cyclical interdependence we take the perspective of a country
that faces a given world rate of interest given import prices, and a given
world demand (except for real exchange rate effects) for its exports. The







(6) i = yy+q—w)
Equation (1) is the IS schedule with e the real exchange rate, and f a
domestic or foreign shift variable. The real interest rate is r. The LM
schedule is represented in equation (2) where the price level is given by ci.
Theprice level is a weighted average of' ciorriestLc prices, whichareseteqsal
towages, and of import prices. Equation (4)definesthe domestic real
interest rate and (5)expresses the assumption of perfect asset
1This section combines sticky price, rational expectations models of exchange
rate dynamics and the sticky real wage literature. See Sachs, (1979),
Branson and Roternberg (1979), Dornbusch (1980), Argy and Salop (1979), Buiter
and Miller (1981, 1982), Marston (1982), Modigliani and Padoa Schioppa (1978)
and Ohstfeld (1982).5
substitutabilitywith an adjustment made for anticipated depreciation. Wage
dynamics are specified in (6) and are linked to the GNP gap, y, and to the
level of real wages. The term q—w represents a rigid realwage effect.2
This model is appropriate to shortruri, cyclical issues.It neglects
trend inflation, foreign inflation, productivity growth and the impact of
capital formation. It concentrates on aggregate demand and the cyclical
interaction between wages, interest rates and exchange rates. Atany point
in time, given home wages, money, and fiscal policy there is a level of the
exchange rate and a rate of depreciation that satisfies the international
interest rate relation. The level of wages and the exchange rate determine
the external competitiveness and hence aggregate demand and employment. The
system can be simplified by noting the relation between home and foreign
interest rates:
(7)rr*+O; ir*+e+
The model is slightly more complex than the extended Mundeli-Fleming model
because of two modifications. On one hand care is taken to allow an impact
of import prices on the price.aevl used to deflate real balances, realwages
and to define the real rate of interest. On the other hand the domestic
producer price index (which here is the wage) responds not only cyclically
but also in reaction tothe level of thereal wagc.
Therole of wage behuvior can be appreciated bylooking at the longrun
behaviorof the system as shown in Figure 1. For a given world
2By choice ofunits the foreign price level and the level of full employment







interest rate the IS schedule shows equilibrium in the domestic goods market.
A real depreciation creates excess demand that is met by an increase in
output. Along i=O money wages are constant. A real depreciation, because it
reduces real wages, leads to wage increases. To keep wages constant the
reduction in the standard of living due to depreciation must be offset by
unemployment that dampens wage demands. Hence v=O is downward sloping. The
slope of the constant wage schedule is determined by the relative response of
wages to the cyclical position and to the standard of living via the real
exchange rate:
= x
Thepattern of wage response will determine the longrun effects of
disturbances on output and the real exchange rate. A reduction in foreign
demand or a rise in world interest rates, for example, will shift the IS
schedule up and to the left. The decline in employment is larger the flatter
the 'i=O schedule or the smaller the cyclical responsiveness of wages relative
to the real wage stickiness as measured by the parameter X. If the wage is
cyclically highly responsive and real wage rigidity is near absent, X tends
toward infinity and the economy behaves as one with full wage and price
flexibilitywhich ensurerapid adjustment to fullemployment.Conversely,
whencyclical flexibility is small and real wage resistance operates
strongly,X tendstoward zero. Adversedisturbances then can lead to a large
impacton the price level combined with unemployment.3
3From equations (1) and (6), setting O'O we obtain:
y(f—br)/(i+nX)7
Themodel in equations (1) to (6) can be reduced to the behavior over
time of money wages and of the real exchange rate. (See the Appendix.) In
Figure 2 we show the dynamics by reference to the loci along which wages and
the real exchange rate respectively are constant. Moving up and along the
O schedule an increase in the wage raises the price level and thus reduces
real balances and exerts a deflationary pressure that causes wages to be
falling unless a cut in the real wage due to real depreciation exerts an
offsetting impact. The schedule PP represents the stable trajectory under
perfect foresight. Given any initial money wage the corresponding point on
FF shows the equilibrium level of the nominal and real exchange rate such
that the economy converged to longrun equilibrium at point A.
At a point like B, for example, the wage is low and thus the price level
tends to be low making for high real balances, and low nominal interest
rates. To maintain international interest parity the exchange rate must be
appreciating, but that means the real exchange rate is above the steady state
level. At a point like B, as we can verify from the Figure, the real
exchange rate favors the home country and by (7), becao.se of real
appreciation, the real interest is below the world level. Thus aggregate
demand and employment are high. Highemploymentand the high real exchange
rate or low real wage exert upward pressure on the wage pushing the economy
toward point A.
Theframework can now be used to investigate the impact offoreign
disturbanceson holllc w;os and enploy;nent.illigure3we studythe effect
of an increase in foreign interest rates. The case we analyze is that where











Figure shows the exchange rate will overshoot, movingimmediately from the
initial equilibrium at point A to a shortrun equilibrium at A'. Therise in
foreign interest rates creates an incipient capital outflow that leads to
exchange depreciation. At point A' home interest rates will have risen
somewhat and there is now expected appreciation thus assuringa sufficient
return on domestic securities. Changes in employment and in the standardof
living combine to generate wage pressure that moves theeconomy over time to
A". In the longrun, of course, there will besome unemployment.
The adjustment pattern is shaped by all the parametersincluding in
particular the dynamics of wages, income and interest responses ofmoney
demand s well as the price elasticity of demand for goods. What iscrucial
to the initial behavior of the exchange rate is the longrunadjustment of
money wages. If wages, increase in the longrun then the exchange rate must
overshoot in the shortrun as shown in Figure 3. By contrast, if in the
longrun wages decline, then there will be an immediate depreciation of the
nominal and real exchange rate, but a more moderate one. In thesubsequent
adjustment process the exchange rate will continue to depreciate. This case
is shown in Figure 4.
It is interesting to note now that one of the two——exchange ratesor
unemployment—-must overshoot. In the case of Figure 4 unemployment must
overshoot because at point A" the real exchange rate is depreciating, which
rneanthatreal interestratesare above the rorid level, an the real
exchangerate is below its longrun level. For both reasons demand and hence
employment at A' will be less than at A" the finalequilibrium. Exactly the









level. It is not certain, though, whether it is possible for employment to
actually rise relative to the initial equilibrium at A.
The overshooting in exchange rates or employment makes it interesting to
ask what factors would make one or the other case more likely. As noted the
outcome depends on the longrun adjustment of wages and that in turn depends
on several parameters. A high price elasticity of demand implies small
changes in equilibrium real exchange rates and therefore relatively little
pressure on wages and output. A high price elasticity thus implies a longrun
increase in wages to accommodate the reduced demand for real balances and
therefore exchange rate overshooting as shown in Figure 3. A high interest
rate elasticity or income elasticity of money demand works in the same
direction. By contrast, a high cyclical relative to real wage response of
wages, implies the possibility that wages could fall in the longrun. In the
same way we can analyze the impact of foreign demand disturbances or changes
in domestic fiscal policy. Again we find the possibility of employment or
exchange rate overshooting depending on the pattern of wage flexibility
relative to the parameters of aggregate demand.
The effects of disturbances on domestic employment, and wages will
presumably differ depending on the direction of change. We would expect an
asymmetry in the real wage resistance in that workers accept gains in real
wages but resist cuts. This extends also to the cyclical behavior of wages;
wagesrise more rapidlyin a boom than they fail in a recess on.In terms of
the model this amounts to sayingthatthe coefficient of wade riexibility, k,
See the appendix for thelongrunsolutions to w and 0.10
dependson the cyclical and real wage position. Specifically, starting from
full employment a fall in foreign demand or higher world interest rates will
lead to unemployment and to a decline in real income. But a rise in foreign
demand or a fall in rates brings about a real appreciation at full employment
rather than a lasting real appreciation beyond capacity.
The asymmetry issue is of relevance once we consider transitory
disturbances. Suppose, for example, that a transitory rise in world demand,
because of a boom abroad, leads to a real appreciation at full employment.
Once the boom abroad subsides the issue arises whether workers are willing to
accommodate themselves to a cut in real income as is brought about by the
ensuing real depreciation. There is no reason to dismiss the possibility of
a ratchet effect in the operation of real wage resistance.
But if ratchet effects are present the cyclical variability of real
exchange rates, as occurs under flexible exchange rates, brings with it the
S
necessityof considering an incomes policy that accommodates the changes in
the standard of living associated with real exchange rate movements.
Alternatively, active fiscal policy needs to be used to stabilize real
exchange rates over the cycle to avoid the real appreciation that cannot,
afterwards, be undone without adverse effects on employment. But that, of
course, raises the question whether there is more fiscal resistance than real
wage resistance. In any event, the point is that transitory disturbances
abound,that transiLoryreal appreoiation bca useof high demand c'aiscs the
standard of living cyclically and that instruments are necessary to dampen or
to accommodate the subsequent decline.
Sofar we have taken the case of a country that takes as given world
demand and interest rates. It is worth commenting briefly on the changes11
brought about by repercussion effects. Without going into detailswe
remember the Muridell—Fleming results that withprices given, a monetary
expansion in one country has adverse employment effects abroad.Conversely,
a fiscal expansion spills into increased employment abroad. Theseresults
depend critically on the behavior of the realmoney stock in each country.
They are not sturdy the moment import prices enter the real balancedeflator.
Specifically, as a fiscal expansion spreads abroad through realappreciation
it reinforces the expansion in the initiatingcountry but it reduces real
balances abroad, thus tending to confine theexpansion. If real wage
resistance is an issue this adverse effect of depreciation isstrongly
reinforced. By contrast a monetary expansion nowmay raise income abroad.
Interest Rates and Risk Premia
The discussion in the previous section was based on theassumption that
securities are perfect substitutes once anticipated exchangedepreciation is
taken into account. Under that assumption real interest ratesare equalized
in longrun equilibrium and in the shortrun can only differby an amount equal
to the rate of change of the real exchange rate. But theassumption of
perfect asset substitution is not warranted once real exchange rates
fluctuate.
Movements in real exchange rates introduce negative correlation in the
real returns of domestic and foreign securities and thus createan incentive
forportfolio diversification. Only in a very cialcase,ihrelative
asset supplies matching the minimumvariance porfo1io shares and with
identicalconsumptionbaskets across countries will there beno risk premium.
In general, there is a risk premium which is related to relativeasset
supplies and to the distribution of world wealth.12
Inthe presence of a risk premium the interest rate relationship
becomes:
(8) i=i*+e+p(V/1,W/Ei) ;p >O.p<0
1 2
whereV and W denote respectively domestic outside debt and domestic wealth
each measured in home currency anddenotes world wealth measured in foreign
currency. Equation (a)thusintroduces a relationship between interest
rates, expected depreciation, the level of nominal exchange rates, nominal
wealth and asset supplies. Where in the earlier model nominal money was the
only asset to play a role, now the supply of domestic outside nominal assets
appears.5 An increase in the relative supply of domestic assets, V/viE, must
be accommodated by a more rapid rate of appreciation or by a higher nominal
interest rate differential or else must be offset by depreciation of the
level of the exchang; rate.
The link between exchange rates and portfolio balance can be inferred
from (8) taking the case of a small country so that the level of world
wealth, W, is taken as given. Furthermore assuming given interest rates and
a given rate of depreciation, i—i—é, we can find the relation between
changes in domestic currency asset supplies, changes in wealth and the





5For references to the extensive risk premium literature see the review in
Dornbusch (1982) and Krugman (1980).13
Equation (9) shows that for a given depreciation adjusted interest
differential, an increase in domestic currency assets and wealth, in the same
proportion, leads to equi—proportionate depreciation. An increase in wealth,
given assets leads by contrast to appreciation. An increase in wealth, via
domestic habitat effects reduces the risk premium and thus brings about
appreciation; an increase in domestic currency asset supply, on the contrary,
leads to a higher risk premium and thus leads to depreciation.
The risk premium introduces two important considerations. The first is
that the comDosition of domestic assets between money and debt (money being
the medium of exchange with a specific demand) matters and that therefore
open market operations exert an effect on exchange rates independently of the
change in money. We can think of this point in the fol1oing manner: The
macro—model sketched above determines interest rates as functions of the real
money stock and real income. The model is closed 'by finding an exchange rate
that satisfies the macromodel and the risk premium equation. An increase in
debt, or in home relative wealth, then must affect both interest rates and
exchange rates.
The second role of the risk premium is to introduce a link between
wealth distribution in the world, interest rates and the exchange rate. A
t'ise in home wealth leads to changes in both interest rates and exchange
rates. Interest rates at home decline and/or the exchange rates appreciatea.
Thiseffoct is addedtothe rnacrotnodeiand prorides a ci:-inne',, through which
dynamic effects assoolatedwith thecurrent account and thebudget have
implicationsforthe exchange rate.
Intervention policy must be considered in relation to the risk premium.
Intervention in that perspective takes oneoftwo forms: if purchases of14
foreignexchange are allowed to change the home money stock we have one set
of results where intersiention will be effective. But if there is
sterilisation there is an implication for the relative supply of domestic
debt and thus for the risk premium. Sterilized intervention, as has been
argued, is simply a reshuffling of the composition of domestic government
liabilitites. It has an effect on exchange rates only through the impact on
the risk premium. Thus it can work only under the conditions in which a risk
premium exists. Moreover the effectiveness—-bang per buck——depends on risk
aversion being high and variability of real interest differentials being
large. Thus intervention policy works well when uncertainty is large and
risk aversion is pervasive.
The risk premium has been singled out as an important channel through
which the current account has effects on the exchange rate. While the
current account thus qualifies in principle as a determinant of exchange
rates it stands to reason that changes in wealth from sources other than the
current account should really move to the center of attection. In particular
capital gains from movements in the stock market certainly have an
overwhelmingly larger impact on relative wealth than does the current
account. In addition to the stock market, we would think of total domestic
saving as a source of changes in relative wealth.Againas a share of saving,
thecurrent account is typically, though not necessarily, small. Except in
thoseparliu ar casa ncial role forthe correctaceocn t., vio tie risk
premium,seerasa largely exaggerated source of' echange rate iaovemerits.
ThirdCountry Effects
Theperspective so far has been that of a country faced with external
shocks. We now move to the perspective of the system to recognize another15
important cyclical source of interdependence that arises from the behavior of
materials prices and import demands of peripheral countries. These countries
are predominant exporters of materials add importers of manufactures. They
are also debtors.
Table 1 reports regressions of various measures of the real prices
received by LDCs as they are affected by the world business cycle, the real
price of oil and the real U.S. dollar exchange rate. The cyclical variable
is the OECD unemployment rate and the real exchange rate is measured by the
IMF relative wholesale prices in manufacturing of the U.S. relative to
trading partners. In equation 1. we show the export relative to import
prices of non—oil LDCs. The real oil price and the real dollar exchange rate
are significant explanatory variables: a dollar appreciation or a rise in
real oil prices deteriorate LDCs' terms of trade. So does a rise in OECD
unemployment although here the coefficient is not precisely estimated.
Equation 1. shows that a one percent real dollar appreciation would
deteriorate LDC termsoftrade by one—third of a percent. This is, of
course, a very sizeable effect.
In equation 2., the dependent variable is the IMF index of the prices of
all commodities deflated by the dollar price of manufacturers exports of
developed countries as reported by the UN. Again we see a significant
adverse impact on the real prices of materials for real dollar appreciation.
Forthis measure of the real price, a one percent real dolLar appreciation
leads to a nearly proportional deterioration in real commodity prices. In
equations3. to 5. we show that the results are not altogether sturdy but
differ significantly across commodities. Equation 3. reports the results for16
the index of 33 commodities of the World Bank deflated by the dollar prices
of manufactures as in 2. The results are substantially the same as in 2.
The index is made up of agricultural commodities (70.6%), metals and minerals
(24.3%) and timber (5.1%). Equation 4. and 5. show that real dollar
appreciation leads to an increase in the real price of minerals and metals,
but to a decline in the real price of agricultural commodities. The latter,
presumably because of their large weight, carry the results in the
regressions for the total commodity group. The difference in the more
disaggregated results suggest that the whole question is in need of more
study including the important issue of using alternative cyclical
variables 6
61n using residuals from a regression of the OECD industrial production index
on two time trends as the cyclical variable regressions performed more poorly
in establishing significant determinants of the lefthand side variable.17







$ Rate R2DWRho1 Rho2
1.Terms of Trade 1.64 -0.01 -0.0001 —0.31.76 1.79
(.70) (.02) (.0004) (.14)
2a. Real Materials
Price (IMP) 9.04 —0.06 —- —0.88.39 1.94 .07
(1.58) (.028) (.32)
2b. Real Materials
Price (IMP) 2.96 —0.15 0.16 —0.78.68 2.17.28 —.73
(1.31) (.03) (.05) (.26)
3a. Real Materials
Prices (Bank) 2.22 —0.05 —— —0.64.25 1.81
(1.63) (.023) (.34)
3b.Real Materials
Prices (Bank) —1.18 —0.16 0.19 —0.49.66 2.02.29 —.59
(1.36) (0.03) (.05) (.27)
4. Real Minerals &
Metals Prices —4.53 —0.20 0.22 0.78.89 1.97
(1.30) (.027) (.os) (.26)
5. Real Agricultural
Prices 3.71 —0.04 -- -0.98.28 1.85 .15
(2.0) (.03) (.41)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. For data description see text and
appendix. The left-hand side variable and the real $ exchange rate are
expressed in logs. So is the real oil price except in equation 1.Rho1 and
Rho2 are the coefficients for correction of first and second order serial
correlation corrections.18
Consider now how these third country effects operate in the case of,
say, a US tightening of monetary policy. Tightening of money would lead to
an increase in nominal and real interest rates in the US and to a slowdown in
demand. The dollar would appreciate in nominal and real terms. We have
already seen the direct effectson industrial countries of higher interest
rates and reduced exports: they uxiarnbiguously translate into unemployment
unless there is no real wage rigidity. But now we have additional effects
that arise from the impact of US events on the material producing, debtor
countries. Higher real interest rates worsen those countries' current
accounts. This is reinforced by the decline in industrial countries demand
for both manufactures and materials. Finally this is reinforced by the
effect of the dollar appreciation on the real prices of materials. The
combination then is quite devastating for material exporting debtor
countries. Typically they will require to confine their own growth because
of balance of payments constraints.
As seen from the perspective of industrial countries the adjustments in
material exporting debtor countries have two sides. For industrial countries
as a group there is a direct terms of trade improvement relative to material
exporters, both cyclical and because of dollar appreciation. This gain may,
however, be dampened in part and perhaps s uhatantially by the decline in LDC
imports of manufactures
Changes in the real p'iceorcoiuaodtLieuinthe cycle o -nby prndu
ofchanges in key exchange rates play an important role in relation to real
wage rigidity. The deterioration in the LDCs' terms of trade may well be an
offset to some of the real income loss an individual industrial country
experiences as a result of say higher US interest rates.19
Bubbles,Pesos and Runs
The preceding sections focussed on actual changes in exchange rate
fundamentals, cyclical or permanent, that affect goods or asset markets and
from there spill to the rest of the world through asset demands, goods
demands, exchange rate movements and prices. But many of the disturbances in
the world economy are not the result of actual changes in fundamentals but
rather of changes in expectations about the future course of these
fundamentals.Theserevisions in expectations exert as powerful effects on
interdependenceasdo actual changes in fundamentals.
When asset markets are dominated by expectations about the future course
of fundamentals, exchange rates may move in ways that do not promote
macroeconomic stability. Three prospects of this possibility deserve special
attention. The first is familiar from the recent literature on financial
markets and concerns the possibility that exchange rates, in part, are
determined by irrelevant information. Market participants may have thewrong
model of fundanientals and their expectations, based on the wrong model, will
affect the actual exchange rate. If there is sufficiently high serial
correlation in the irrelevant variables it may be impossible to discern the
systematic forecast errors by convential efficiency tests.But it is also
the case that the exchange rate would be significantly more volatile than is
iarrmted bythetrue aode
This point is importaat because market particijont may beimpressed by
oneor the other plausible fundamentals variable, attribute explanatory power
to it and, through theirexpectations, make their expectations actually come
tobe true. Then, when some other variable moves, attention shifts to
different "main factor" which in turn comes to dominate the exchange rate for20
a while. Exchange rates carried by irrelevant beliefs are troublesome not
only because of the excess variance but also because the shifting from one
irrelevant factor to another will precipitate major exchange rate collapses.
The possibility that exchange rates are sometimes far off fundamentals cannot
be discounted. It is important to recognize because we may have given
excessive weight to the notion that the market knows "the model" and at the
same time is rational. It is quite conceivable that a number of fashionable
factors such as "fiscal discipline," "basic monetary control," "longrun
strength in manufacturing," "Angebotofreundliche Gesellschaftspolitik" all
play their role, one at a time.
The second source of disequilibrium exchange rates arises from
expectations about the possibility of regime changes and has been called the
"peso problem." In this perspective exchange rates are influenced by current
fundamentals but also by agents' expectations that these fundamentals may
change, with given probabilities, in specific directions. If market
participants have sufficiently strong beliefs that a given course of policy
will not be followed they may, in fact, make it impossible to follow that
course. Under flexible exchange rates this problem is acute because the
exchange rate is so flexible a price and so much governed by expectations.
It may well be argaed, as have been indeed in the discussion of the French
stabilisation experience under Poincare, that speculators are the true judges
of rondaricatalaan]that acol1ase a the exchorie nate hrt about'ev
adverse capital ilows is irrevoca1a evidence ofa programof stahilisatice
that lacked infundamentals. Butthatview is certainly simplistic once it
isrecognized that stabilisation policy has a wide range of indeterminacy.7
7See Flood and Garber (1982, 1982b), Salant and Henderson (1978), lozondo
(1980) and Blanchard (1982) for discussions of regime change.21
The third way in which exchange rates can deviate from equilibrium
corresponds to the notion of bubbles. Here holders of an asset realize that
the asset is overpriced, but are willing to hold it in the expectation that
there will only be some probability of a collapse to fundamentals within a
given holding period and that there is an expectation that the asset can be
passed on with capital gains sufficiently large to reward the risk of a
collapse.8 Bubbles correspond to a situation where a currency has
appreciated beyond what can be considered fundamentals, where an
overvaluation is widely thought to prevail, but where continuing appreciation
is underway untilsomedisturbance causes the crash. There are no models of
the crash as yet hut it must be clear that an essential ingredient is the
arrival of new information that diverts a sufficient number of speculators
from keeping the bubble growing.
Bubbles, peso problems and irrelevant information all have in common
that they take the exchange rate way from the particular equilibrium implied
by current fundamentals. In each of these cases there is a reevaluation of
the beliefs and when this occurs exchange rates move a lot, move a lot
relative to fundamentals, and therefore may force an accommodating change in
policies. Unless policies are very exogeneous, instability of policies may
be provoked by instability of expectations. That means flexible exchange
rates may require as an institutioflal setting muchmore exogeniety of
policies thu cfactexit today. Without such ananchor fiexFuiiityof
exchange rates may aggravate macroeconomic instability.
8SeeTirole (1982)and Blanchard (1979).22
II. Coping WithInterdependence
In the late 1960s discussion of international monetary arrangements
centered on the idea of "flexing" the system. Exchange rates were too
fixed to be compatible with an overvalued dollar and the one-way street that
overvaluation created for internationally mobile, speculative capital. Today
much of the debate starts from the recognition that it is desirable to reduce
the excessive fluctuations in exchange rates that exert undesirable
interdependence effects. The quest then is for flixed exchange rates: the
optimal exchange rate regime would prevent persistent overvaluation or
undervaluation of a currency which would ultimately lead to protection or an
undesirable monetary—fiscal policy mix. The rate system would also have to
be flexible enough to yield longrun inflation autonomy. But at the same time
shortrun real exchange rate variability should be reduced and export of
inflation through appreciation would be limited. There is little question
that a flexible exchange rate system has desirable longrun features and that
these should not be easily sacrificed. But at the same time the shorturn
implication of dissynchronised policy actions are sufff±ciently severe to
raise the question whether exchange rates are too flexible at present. That
question of course can be answered only relative to a set of alternative
arrangements.
Among alternativeatothe present systeia there are three lines of
reform:a rt:r:i to fb:dr quai—fixed ratis ,tir,itiLtooscu the
incentivesto move capital, and limited exchange rate flexibility. We
comment briefly on aspects of each of these.
A return to outright fixed exchange rates appearsadventurous. It would
berendered difficult because of large discrepancies in inflation rates among23
key industrial countries. The willingness to impose trade restrictions seems
striking confimation that there is no disposition among major industrial
countries to abide by rules. An outright comrnitnient to peg would yield at
best a variety of EMS. The difficulties in a fixed rate system are
aggravated by the instability in at least two key-countries, the U.S. and the
U.K.
An alternative to fixed rates has been proposed by McKinnon (1982). He
argues that exchange rate instability and instability of world inflation are
the outgrowth of misconceived monetarism. The right kind of monetarism would
look at the world quantity of money. Specifically he argues (p. 331):
"... the solution to international currency instability
is straightforward: the Federal Reserve System should
discontinueits policy of passively sterilizingthe domestic
monetaryimpact of foreignofficial interventions. Instead,
a symmetrical non—sterilisation rule would ensure that each
country's money supply mutually adjusts to international
currencysubstitution in the shortrun without having official
exchange interventions destabilize theworld's money supply."
Thebasic premiseof this prescription, and itsflaw, is that itassumes that
exchangerate instability is induced by shifts in the currency denomination
ofthe public's money holding, i.e. currency suhstituton. But surely
internat ionai c rrer speculat L' is no CL&rrLedout y Ohlfth jseen
different country's Mis,butby shifts beLoon interest bearing ossets. The
proposal also encounteis the non—negligible issue of the transition to low
inflationin the U.S. Itcertainlydoes not help to overlook that inflation
today, in the U.S., is significantly higher than it is in Japan and in24
Germany.As noted above, however, monetary policy seeks to achieve a
transition to low inflation and it is the byproduct of that transition which
causes the real exchange rate havoc.
Proposals for more limited exchange rate flexibility take the form of
intervention rules. They may either involve an exchange rate band (fixed or
moving) with full intervention at the margin and none in between, or they
involve an intervention rule that seeks to dampen exchange rate movements
relative to some notion of a fundamentals—rate.
Proponents of band—proposals are reluctant to specify how it is that the
band would actually be set. They emphasize, as does Bergaten (1982, p. ii):
"there is no suggestion here of a return to fixed
exchange rates, nor even to seeking "correct rates"
with narrow margins. It should be possible, however,
to reach international agreement on the existence of
"wrongrates"——as was done in November 1978, and seems
largely possible today. Rates could then bepushed
hacktoward appropriate zones through direct interven-
tion, alterations in domestic policies and public
announcements."
Oneobjection to an exchange rate band is thatsuch an arrangement
actually promotes exchange rate instability within the band. The presence of
a Land reduces risk to portfolioholdersand therefore inc rease portfolio
shifts in response to perceived changes in mean returns. Thus given random
movementsin mean return expectations there will he more exchange rate
variability within the band than would be the case without such limits and
the larger risk of speculation. Moreover, it is not clear why a rate should
be allowed to go too far, only to be pushed back afterwards. If there25
canbe agreement on what is too far then there can be agreement on a limiting
point. But of course that is precisely where national interests may differ
as the case of the U.S. dollar throught the 1960s has shown so clearly. It
also stands to reason that authorities who take .a view on what is a rate that
has gone too far will take a view on what is too rapid a return. Thus
intervention might dampen the correction of exchange rates and in thisway
too reduce the risk of speculation, thus enhancing actual capital flows.
The basic objection to a band proposal is that it makes no sense to set
limits for exchange rates and not for other key macroeconomic variables.
Exchange rate targets without an accompanying, well understood macroeconomic
support program can hardly be accepted to be effective. Macroeconomic
policies geared exclusively to exchange rate targets rather than a broader
range of targets including real interest rates, the real value of the stock
market, inflation and unemploynient, may well deteriorate macroeconomic
performance. In the absence of such a broader spectrum of targets one can
only expect the poor results from intervention policy observed, for example,
in the 1979 Carter period of overexpansion.
An alternative approach to limited exchange rate variability is based on
the idea that it is possible to extract, at least approximately, from market
data the sources of disturbances in the exchange rate. To the extent that
these disturbances are portfolio shifts between currency denominations they
should be ascomaod te. by hiterreton.This the:anda t'uaentkno:i
fromthe literature about interest rate versus money uock targets.In that
context the rule is to peg interest rates, allowing uloney to vary, if
disturbances are primarily financial. In the present context the rule is to
stabilizeexchange rates if disturbances are primarily portfolio shifts
rather than events that call for changes in the equilibrium real exchange26
rate.Specifically, if disturbances can unambiguously be identified as
shifts between domestic and foreign currency debt, the appropriate policy is
sterilized intervention keeping the exchange rate as well as interest rates
fixed. The same would be the case for portfolio shifts between home money
and home securities although this would not require intervention.
Once, however, disturbances are both real and financial and
identification becomes ambiguous the case for rigid intervention disappears.
Formal models, in these mixed cases, suggest that managed floating becomes
the optimal exchange rate regime.9 The extent to which the exchange rate
would be more nearly fixed depends on the relative variability of real and
financial shocks, the authorities' concern with the composition of aggregate
demand as well as the level of activity and the certainty about the structure
of the economy. The strong case for sterilized intervention that arises when
all disturbances are pure portfolio shifts disappears and leaves little in
terms of sturdy rules.
Intervention policy cannot cope with the main source of exchange rate
movements, namely divergent national monetary policies. When money is
tightened in one country to reduce inflation, the financial disturbance is in
fact deliberately produced by the govenment in the hope of reducing
inflation. Moreover, the initial real appreciation, because it reduces
inflation, is a welcome part of the disinflation process. Intervention would
mennforcing thomonetary contraction on the rent of the worldeventhough
cyclical conditions abroad may not call for tightmoney. Of course, the re3t
ofthe world might ursuetight money to stabilize the exchange rate but at
the same time implement a fiscal expansion to maintain aggregate demand in
9See Henderson (1982) and Frenkel (1976).27
the face of higher interest rates and lower net exports. This policy is open
to the objection that fiscal policy is overused and that cyclical expansions
can rarely be undone.
III. Concluding Remarks
The preceding discussion argues that active policy measures, as much as
the business cycle itself, cannot fail to spill from one country to another,
whatever the exchange rate regime. What the exchange rate regime does
determine is the particular shape of the spill—over, namely whether it takes
the form primarily of a decline in employment with relatively unchanged
competitiveness and inflation, or whether there are large changes in
inflation and real exchange rates (and therefore in real income) but
relatively smaller changes in employemt. It is in this area that fixed and
flexible rates differ sensitively and interact with the domestic structure,
in particular real wage rigidity. It is here that one has to recognize
Mundell's (1968) point that the case for flexible exchange rate rests
fundamentally on money illusion, in the sense that there is an absence of
real wage rigidity.
Flexible exchange rates can work well when financial disturbances are
identifiable and can be accommodated br the appropriate sterilized
intervention and when, in addition, real disturbances can be met by changes
in real exchuige eateo thit do noOof1fljct'ithfullemployuent.Failind
these two requirements there are longrunadvantuges of a flexible rate
system.But there are also shortrun costs, possibly high, that come from
the very fact that theexchange rate is tooflexible. Theseshortrun costs
in turn are higher the more policymakers, mistakenly, believe that flexible
rates are tantamount to macroeconomic independence. If this is the case,28
flexiblerates may well be a disintegrating force in the world economy.This
was recognized already in the 1960s whenthe German government noted:
"Fixed exchange rates are an indispensable element
in a world committed to integration; with a system
of flexible rates the existing readiness to cooperative
and integrate might be destroyed at the first appearance
of serious difficulties since flexible rates would
offer such an easy opportunity for isolatedaction."1°
If flexible exchange rates, in the course of stabilisation policy,lead
to excessive real exchange rate changes, and if these arethe source of
adverse spill—over effects, a reduction in the incentivesto move capital
international may be a remedy. The case for restrictions oninternational
capital flows of one kind or another is old. Specifically,Modigliani (1972)
argued:
- a
"...theremay arise a need, at least inthe shortrun,
for holding private capital movements in line withthe
achievable transfer of real capital. To achieve this goal,
without outright limitation on the freedoni of capital
movements, countries could rely on general fiscal policy
as one of the possible devices forinfluencing incentiveto
capital movements. But they should also beallowed to opt,
just as freely, 'ortheoitErn-Li-c apprOai rl;
specific tax and related incentives, which, wehave argued,
is likely o be superior under most circumstances."
The same view has beenarticulated by Tobin (1978)and Liviathan (1979).
10Quoted in Cooper (1968), p. 223.29
The argumentforspecific taxes to reduce the incentives for
international capital flows has been objected to on three grounds. The
first, and most serious, is that they limit exchange rate movements and
therefore imply a transmission of macroeconomic disturbances through the
current account. A tight money policy in a large country would lead to a
decline in real income world—wide as would be the case under a regime of
fixed exchange rates thus avoiding the effects of exchange rate movements on
real wages and on the price level. The second objection argues that taxes on
capital flows cannot work because they lead rapidly to all kinds of evasions
including offshore markets. There is no doubt truth to that objection,
although its force is limited in the case of transitory taxes, as would be
appropriate during a period of divergent policy in a particular country.
The last objection to interest equalization taxes is that they interfere
with the efficient operation of the world capital market. This argment, I
believe, is actually wrong. It mistakes the shortterm money market rate for
the social productivity of capital. Suppose a country reduces money growth
and this leads to an increase in the interest rate on financial assets, as it
will. Incipient capital flows will lead to currency appreciation and a
current account deterioration financed by borrowing abroad.1' It is hard to
argue that the current account deficit is a reflection of enhanced investment
opportunities or increase time preference that, in an efficient and
integrat capital market;, tioulri call for redi rectionof lending to'i ciithe
home country. Onthe contrary, the decline in denand will have reduced the
profitability of domestic real capital. It therefore would not be optimal
'1See Dornbusch (1980) or Buiter and Miller (1981, (1982).29a
for capital to flow toward the country practicing a monetary tightening.
A policy intervention, in these circumstances, could well enhance the
efficiency of capital allocation in the world. Needlesss to say this
is an area where not much research has taken place to date.
But even if restrictions on capital flows were imposed, and as a
consequence less of the adjustment took place through relative prices
and adverse spill—over effects on inflation, there would still be trans-
mission of disturbances through the current account. The simple fact
is that, whatever the exchange rate regime, there will be transmission of
real disturbances in some form. This suggests that the proper search
might be for a policy mix that makes disinflation less of a real disturbance.
The answer that is being widely suggested in this respect is incomes
policy combined with a monetary rule. Experience with incomes policy is
not encouraging by any means, but there is also a wide belief that a
flexible exchange rate system without a firm anchor both in monetary rulers
and effective supply side policies is proving severely disruptive to
the established liberal world order of growth and open trade and capital
markets.30
APPENDIX
Combining (1) and (2), and using (3)—(5) as well as (7), leads to the
following system of equations:
A—i m—w —(i—)O=h(f+aO_br*_bO)c(r*+O+w)
A—2 w =y(f_br*_bC+aO)+ o(1—)Q
whichdefines the rates of change of wages and of the real exchange rate:
A—3 =[((l—)(bt3(y—cdj)—ctc)—a)'c)U—ycf—b(m—w)+ ycb(l_)r*]/A
A—4 Eb(cy—h)—c<0 by assumption.
A—5 0 =[(m.w)+(a(c-y'—h) + (ca—l)(l—))& + (c(l—by)+hb)r* + (cy—h)fJ/A
The slopes of the schedules in Figure 1 are given by:





The longrun solutions for wages and the real exchange rate are:
A—8 0 =[bXr*—AfjI(i+aX)
and
A—9 w =m+(c-i- b(h— y/a)/(i+aX))r* —((h—y/a)/(1±aA))f
and are obtained bsetting'i=S=O in A—i and A—2.32
Data
In Table 1 the cyclical variable is the OECD unemployment rate which is
available only since 1964. The real oil price is measured as the dollar
price of oil deflated by the U.S. GNP deflator. The non—oil LDC terms of
trade are measured by the ratio of export to import prices reported in the
International Financial Statistics 74d/201 and 75d/201. The real exchange
rate for the dollar is reported in the same source in the section "Cost and
Price Comparisons in Manufacturing" where we have used the measure "Relative
Wholesale Prices."
The real material price in equation 2. is the index of the prices of all
comniodities in line 76ax of the International Financial Statistics deflated
by the dollar export price of manufactures of industrialized countries
reported in the U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. In equation 3. an index
of 33 commodity prices is used. The index is prepared by the Commodities and
cport Projections Division of the World Bank and the most recent data are
contained in Table 15 of the July 1982 Update. The indices for agricultural
prices and the prices of the group metals and minerals are contained in the
same source.33
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